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roles and missions - from war, to 
peacekeeping, to intelligence, to 
FRXQWHUWHUURULVP DQG HI¿FLHQF\
IXO¿OOLQJ WKH DVVLJQHG UROHV DQG
PLVVLRQV DW DPLQLPXP FRVW RI WKH
VHFXULW\IRUFHVDUPHGIRUFHVSROLFH
forces, and intelligence agencies).
7KLV DUWLFOH IRFXVHV WKH PLOLWDU\
HIIHFWLYHQHVVGLPHQVLRQRIWKH&05
,W GLVFXVVHVZK\ LW LV LPSRUWDQW DQG
ZKDW QHZHU GHPRFUDFLHV FDQ GR WR
VXFFHVVIXOO\GHYHORSHIIHFWLYHDUPHG
IRUFHV7KHDUWLFOHSURYLGHV³OHVVRQV
OHDUQHGEHVW SUDFWLFHV´ RI DFKLHYLQJ
HIIHFWLYHQHVV IURP WKUHH GHYHORSLQJ
GHPRFUDFLHV  &KLOH +XQJDU\ DQG
0RQJROLD :KLOH D FRPSDULVRQ
EHWZHHQWKHWKUHHFRXQWULHVPD\VHHP
DVWUHWFKDW¿UVWJODQFHGXHWRGLIIHUHQW
JHRJUDSKLF ORFDWLRQV DQG KLVWRULFDO
EDFNJURXQGV WKH WKUHHFRXQWULHVDUH
DFWXDOO\ZRUWKFRPSDULQJIRUDWOHDVW
WKH IROORZLQJ UHDVRQV WKH\ LQFOXGH
WKUHH GHPRFUDWL]DWLRQ DUHDV /DWLQ
America, Eastern Europe, Asia); 
1. INTRODUCTION
7KH SXUSRVH RI WKLV DUWLFOH LV WR
contribute to a better understanding 
RI WKH FRQWHPSRUDU\ YDOXH IRU
GHPRFUDF\ RI WKH UHODWLRQVKLS
EHWZHHQ HOHFWHG OHDGHUV DQG WKH
armed forces. It draws from an 
DUWLFOH ZULWWHQ LQ FROODERUDWLRQ ZLWK
7KRPDV %UXQHDX DQG SXEOLVKHG E\
Democratization in 2008, entitled 
³7RZDUGV D 1HZ &RQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQ
RI 'HPRFUDWL]DWLRQ DQG &LYLO
0LOLWDU\5HODWLRQV´ZKLFKH[SDQGHG
WKH SUHYDOHQW FLYLOPLOLWDU\ UHODWLRQV
&05FRQFHSWFRQFHUQHGSULPDULO\
ZLWK WKHDUPHGIRUFHVDQGQDUURZHG
WR LVVXHV RI PLOLWDU\ LQWUXVLRQ LQ
GRPHVWLF SROLWLFV WKURXJK coups
d’état and asserting civilian control) 
WRDFRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQDQGIUDPHZRUN
WKDW EHWWHU VXLW WKH WZHQW\¿UVW
FHQWXU\VHFXULW\ODQGVFDSHDWULQLW\
of democratic civilian control, 
HIIHFWLYHQHVV IXO¿OOLQJ WKH DVVLJQHG
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The purpose of this article is to contribute to a better understanding of the 
contemporary value for democracy of the relationship between elected leaders 
and the armed forces. Hence, it focuses on the military effectiveness dimension of 
the CMR. It discusses why it is important and what newer democracies can do to 
successfully develop effective armed forces. The article provides “lessons learned/
best practices” of achieving effectiveness from three developing democracies - Chile, 
Hungary, and, Mongolia.
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7KHUH LV KRZHYHU OHVV DWWHQWLRQ
LQ WKH OLWHUDWXUH RQ GHPRFUDWLF
FRQVROLGDWLRQ DQG FLYLO ± PLOLWDU\
UHODWLRQV HVSHFLDOO\ LQ UHODWLRQ WR
ZKDWWKHDUPHGIRUFHVGRWKDWLVWKHLU
HIIHFWLYHQHVV DQG WKH LPSOLFDWLRQV
RI WKHLU UROHV DQG PLVVLRQV IRU
GHPRFUDF\ 7KLV LV YHU\ VXUSULVLQJ
EHFDXVH WRGD\ ZKHQ WKH WUDGLWLRQDO
LQWHUVWDWH FRQÀLFW KDV YLUWXDOO\
GLVDSSHDUHG ZLWK IHZ H[FHSWLRQV
YHU\ IHZ PLOLWDULHV DUH SULPDULO\
trained, resourced, and prepared 
WR ZDJH FRPEDW ZLWK RWKHU DUPHG
IRUFHV DUPHG FRPEDW LV SUREDEO\
WKH OHDVW OLNHO\ UROH WKDW PLOLWDULHV
DUH FXUUHQWO\ FDUU\LQJ RXW 0RUH
VSHFL¿FDOO\ DUPHG IRUFHV WRGD\ DUH
involved in peace support operations 
362  LQ ³QDWLRQ EXLOGLQJ´ HJ
LQ $IJKDQLVWDQ LQ ¿JKWLQJ VWUHHW
JDQJV HJ +DLWL LQ  ZKLFK
LV PRUH W\SLFDOO\ D SROLFH IXQFWLRQ
in supporting or supplanting police 
forces in operations to combat drug 
WUDI¿FNLQJ DQG VWUHHW FULPH RU
¿JKW WHUURULVP HJ 0H[LFR 7KLV
FRPELQDWLRQ RI DFWLYLWLHV DUH WKH
LVVXHV WKDW GHPRFUDWLFDOO\ HOHFWHG
SROLF\PDNHUVPXVWGHDOZLWKWRPHHW
GRPHVWLF DQG LQFUHDVLQJO\ JOREDO
H[SHFWDWLRQV DQG VWDQGDUGV 7KH
H[FOXVLYH IRFXV RQ FLYLOLDQ FRQWURO
LQ WKLV OLWHUDWXUH LV D VLJQL¿FDQW
LPSHGLPHQW WR XQGHUVWDQGLQJ WKH
ODUJHUDQGPRUHFRPSOH[UHODWLRQVKLSV




WR¿OO WKHVH ODFXQDH6HFRQG ,KRSH
WRLQWHUHVWSROLF\PDNHUVLQQHZHURU
WKH\ ZHUH UHSUHVVLYH GLFWDWRUVKLSV
GHVSLWH WKH GLFWDWRULDO SDVWV
WKH\ DUH FRQVLGHUHG FRQVROLGDWHG
GHPRFUDFLHV DIWHU WZHQW\ \HDUV
RU VR WKH\ SURJUHVVLYHO\ \HW
VXFFHVVIXOO\ HQJDJHG LQ &05 DQG
'HIHQVH ,QVWLWXWLRQ %XLOGLQJ ',%
UHIRUPV VLQFH WKH HQG RI WKH QRQ
GHPRFUDWLF UHJLPHV DQG WKH\ DUH
FXUUHQWO\ LPSRUWDQW VHFXULW\ DFWRUV




2. RELEVANCE OF THE 
TOPIC
,Q WKLV DUWLFOH , DVSLUH WR
DFKLHYH WKUHH JRDOV )LUVW , KRSH WR
FRPSOHPHQW WKH FXUUHQW UHVHDUFK
DQG OLWHUDWXUH RQ FLYLOPLOLWDU\
UHODWLRQV DQG ',% 9LUWXDOO\ DOO RI




OLWHUDWXUH XVXDOO\ IRFXVHV RQKRZ WR
DFKLHYHWKHFRQWUROVXSSRVHGO\DOUHDG\
H[LVWLQJ LQ WKH PRUH HVWDEOLVKHG
GHPRFUDFLHV 7KDW LV EHFDXVH
SROLF\ PDNHUV LQ QHZ GHPRFUDFLHV
HVSHFLDOO\LQWKRVHZKHUHWKHPLOLWDU\
was WKH JRYHUQPHQW GXULQJ WKH
previous non-democratic regime 
HJ/DWLQ$PHULFDDQGVWLOOHQMR\V
prerogatives it negotiated during 
WKH WUDQVLWLRQ WR GHPRFUDF\ WHQG WR
IRFXV&05 UHIRUPRQO\ RQ FRQWURO
&RQWURO DOVR UHPDLQV UHOHYDQW DV
PRUHWUDGLWLRQDOLVVXHVRIFRXSVKDYH
KRZHYHUQRWWRWDOO\GLVDSSHDUHGHJ
+RQGXUDV  RU (FXDGRU 
As previously mentioned, armed 
IRUFHV DUH QRW VROHO\ IXO¿OOLQJ
traditional combat missions. 
Currently, there are at least six [2] 
PDMRUFDWHJRULHVRIUROHVDQGPLVVLRQV
WKDWDUPHGIRUFHVFDUU\RXW¿JKW
DQG EH SUHSDUHG WR ¿JKW H[WHUQDO
ZDUV  ¿JKW DQG EH SUHSDUHG WR
¿JKWLQWHUQDOZDUVRULQVXUJHQFLHV
¿JKWJOREDOWHUURULVP¿JKWFULPH
5) provide support for humanitarian 
assistance; and, 6) prepare for and 
execute peace support operations. 
It is a very broad spectrum of roles 
and missions, which democratically 
elected civilians must deal with 
HIIHFWLYHO\ LQ RUGHU WR¿JKW QDWLRQDO
DQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\FKDOOHQJHV
7KXV IRFXVLQJ &05 UHIRUP RQO\
RQFLYLOLDQFRQWUROKLQGHUVWKHODUJHU
and more complex relationships 
FRQFHUQLQJ GHPRFUDF\ HOHFWHG
policy makers, and security forces. 
In a democracy, policy makers craft 
and implement security decisions 
and policies that are in service of 
VDIHJXDUGLQJ GHPRFUDWLF YDOXHV
national interests, and citizens; 
VXFFHVVIXO SROLFLHV KRZHYHU JR
hand in hand with effective security 
forces. Even when civilian control 
is unquestioned, as in the United 
States, civilian control by itself is no 
JXDUDQWHHWKDWWKHSROLF\PDNHUVZLOO
PDNH JRRG GHFLVLRQV RU LPSOHPHQW
policy in such a way as to result in 
PLOLWDU\VXFFHVV>@
But what does military 
effectiveness involve? Effectiveness 
LQ IXO¿OOLQJDQ\RI WKH VL[ UROHVDQG
PLVVLRQVUHTXLUHVWKHIROORZLQJ)LUVW
there must be a plan in place, which 
PD\WDNHWKHIRUPRIDVWUDWHJ\RUHYHQ
FXUUHQWO\ HPHUJLQJ GHPRFUDFLHV RQ
why it is incumbent on them to invest 
WLPHDQGHIIRUWLQGHYHORSLQJHIIHFWLYH
armed forces in a security context that 
ODFNV WUDGLWLRQDO FRQÀLFW DQG KRZ
they can contribute to reform. Third, 
I expect the article to be relevant to 
policy makers and armed forces in 
developed democracies, which are 
LQFUHDVLQJO\HQFRXUDJLQJFRRSHUDWLRQ
with newer democracies to avert 
QDWLRQDO DQG JOREDO VHFXULW\ WKUHDWV
,W LV LPSRUWDQW IRU JRYHUQPHQWV LQ
developed democracies to know 
they can cooperate with compatible 
and capable armed forces from 
newer democracies, which are also 
accountable.
3. EFFECTIVENESS 
IN FULFILLING ROLES 
AND MISSIONS
As previously mentioned, I have 
learned from my experience with the 
&HQWHU IRU &LYLO0LOLWDU\ 5HODWLRQV
&&05 DQG 1DWLRQDO 6HFXULW\
$IIDLUV 16$ 'HSDUWPHQW RI WKH
136 LQ ZRUNLQJ ZLWK FLYLOLDQV DQG
PLOLWDU\ RI¿FHUV LQ FRQVROLGDWLQJ
GHPRFUDFLHV WKDW &05 DQG
democratic reform of the armed 
forces) should not focus entirely on 
civilian control.  Thus, while civilian 
control is considered a fundamental 
aspect of democratic consolidation, 
and is not assumed to exist in any 
particular case, it is only a part of the 
analysis [1]. Analysis of how effective 
security forces are is also necessary 
to understand the contemporary 
importance for democracy of the 
relationship between elected leaders 
and the military.  
IURPRXWVLGHHJ1$72PHPEHUVKLS
requirements) to recruit civilians and 
PDNH WKHP VWDEOH LQ WKHLU SRVLWLRQV
&RQYHUVHO\ FRXQWULHV LQ /DWLQ
$PHULFD ODFN VXFK LQVWLWXWLRQV $W
D PLQLPXP WKH\ KDYH UHFUXLWHG
FLYLOLDQV DQG SURYLGHG WKHP ZLWK
stable careers), but for administrative 
MREV $UJHQWLQD &KLOH ,Q WKRVH
FDVHVZKHUH WKHUHDUHVXEMHFWPDWWHU
H[SHUWVWKHLUSRVLWLRQVDUHQRWVWDEOH
(Argentina). Democratic control 
FDQ DOVR FRQWULEXWH WR PLOLWDU\
HIIHFWLYHQHVV ,I WKHUH LV D FHUWDLQ
amount of willingness and interest 
ZKHWKHU GXH WR LQWHUQDO RU H[WHUQDO
incentives), but also knowledge and 
H[SHUWLVH LQ GHIHQVH DQG VHFXULW\
HJ SROLF\ PDNHUV NQRZ ZKDW
TXHVWLRQVWRDVNDQGKRZWRSURYLGH
UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV WR LPSURYH WKH
DFWLYLW\ RI WKH PLOLWDU\ RQ WKH SDUW
RIWKHHOHFWHGFLYLOLDQVDUPHGIRUFHV
FDQIXO¿OOWKHLUUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVEHWWHU
$V &05 VFKRODU 'HERUDK $YDQW
FRQWHQGV ³+DYLQJ PRUH FLYLOLDQV
FRQWURO WKH DUP\PDGH LW HDVLHU QRW
KDUGHU IRU WKH DUP\ WRPDLQWDLQ LWV
IRFXV´>@,QVWLWXWLRQDOL]LQJFRQWURO
DQGRYHUVLJKWLQDZD\WKDWSURYLGHV
top-level direction and general 
RYHUVLJKW JXLGDQFH DV RSSRVHG WR
PDOIHDVDQFH RU FURQ\LVP OHDGV WR
LPSURYHGHIIHFWLYHQHVV,QWKH86WKH
*ROGZDWHU1LFKROV'HSDUWPHQW
RI 'HIHQVH 5HRUJDQL]DWLRQ $FW LV
D JRRG H[DPSOH WR WKLV HQG ,W ERWK
reinforced democratic civilian 
FRQWURO DQG PDQGDWHG MRLQWQHVV IRU
WKH PLOLWDU\ VHUYLFHV LQ WKH 8QLWHG
6WDWHV&RORPELDLVDOVRDQLQWHUHVWLQJ
FDVH3UHVLGHQW$OYDUR8ULEH
 XQGHUWRRN VWURQJ SHUVRQDO
DGRFWULQH([DPSOHVLQFOXGHQDWLRQDO
VHFXULW\ VWUDWHJLHV QDWLRQDO PLOLWDU\
strategies, strategies for disaster 
relief, doctrine on intelligence, 
FRXQWHU WHUURULVP GRFWULQH DQG WKH
OLNH6HFRQGWKHUHPXVWEHVWUXFWXUHV
DQG SURFHVVHV ERWK WR IRUPXODWH WKH
SODQV DQG LPSOHPHQW WKHP 7KHVH
ZRXOGLQFOXGH0LQLVWULHVRI'HIHQVH
1DWLRQDO 6HFXULW\ &RXQFLOOLNH
RUJDQL]DWLRQV RU RWKHU PHDQV RI




HTXLSPHQW WUDLQHG IRUFHV DQG RWKHU




ZRXOG HIIHFWLYHO\ LPSOHPHQW DQ\ RI
WKHVHUROHVDQGPLVVLRQV
$OWKRXJK LW LV UDWKHU GLI¿FXOW
to assess success of effectiveness 
>@ ZKDW FRPHV RXW FOHDUO\ IURP
WKH SUHFHGLQJ GLVFXVVLRQ LV WKH
LPSRUWDQFH RI WKH LQVWLWXWLRQV DV D
02'DQGD16& 7KDW LV WKH\DUH
FULWLFDO WR PDNLQJ WKH DUPHG IRUFHV
ZRUN RU QRW 7KHUH LV HYLGHQFH
IURP QHZ DQG QRW VR QHZ 1$72
FRXQWULHV WKDW WKH\ FUHDWHG UREXVW
LQVWLWXWLRQV ZKLFK DUH VWDIIHG E\
FHUWDLQ QXPEHUV RI FLYLOLDQV ZLWK
VRPH OHYHO RI H[SHUWLVH DQG ZLWK
VWDELOLW\ VXFK DV PHPEHUV RI WKH
1DWLRQDO6HFXULW\&RXQFLOV0LQLVWHUV
RI'HIHQVH'HSXW\0LQLVWHUVKHDGV
RI GHSDUWPHQWV DQG RI¿FHV ZLWKLQ
WKH PLOLWDULHV DV ZHOO DV VXEMHFW
PDWWHUVH[SHUWV1HYHUWKHOHVVWKHVH
countries were more or less required 
3. +DYH WKH FLYLOLDQ SROLF\
PDNHUV FRPPLWWHG UHVRXUFHV LQ WKH
IRUPRISROLWLFDOFDSLWDOPRQH\DQG
SHUVRQQHO WR HQVXUH WKH UHVSHFWLYH
FRXQWU\ KDV VXI¿FLHQW HTXLSPHQW
WUDLQHGIRUFHVDQGRWKHUDVVHWVQHHGHG
WR LPSOHPHQW WKHDVVLJQHG UROHVDQG
missions?
4. ,I HLWKHU RU DOO RI WKHVH
GHYHORSPHQWV KDYH WDNHQLV WDNLQJ
SODFH ZKDW KDV PRWLYDWHGLV
PRWLYDWLQJ WKH FLYLOLDQV WR LQYHVW LQ
HIIHFWLYHQHVVRIWKHPLOLWDU\"
,WPXVW EH HPSKDVL]HG IURP WKH
YHU\ EHJLQQLQJ WKDW PRVW RI WKHVH
FDVHV ZHUH LQWHQWLRQDOO\ VHOHFWHG DV
H[DPSOHV RI DFKLHYLQJ HIIHFWLYHQHVV
LQPLOLWDU\UHIRUPLQPRVWFRXQWULHV
ZLWK ZKLFK , DP IDPLOLDU SROLF\
makers are unable to contribute or are 
not at all interested in defense reform 
in general, let alone effectiveness. 
4.1. CHILE [6]
&KLOH KDV VWDUWHG LWV MRXUQH\
WR GHPRFUDWL]DWLRQ ZLWK D ELJ JDS
EHWZHHQ WZR ZRUOGV DQ HPHUJLQJ




DOO /DWLQ $PHULFDQ QHLJKERUV
LQFOXGLQJ KLJK UHVRXUFHV IRU WKH




FRPSDQ\ &2'(/&2 IRU ZHDSRQV
and equipment acquisitions). 
5HGXFLQJ WKH JDS EHWZHHQ WKH WZR
ZRUOGVHJE\VWUHQJWKHQLQJFLYLOLDQ
LQWHUHVW H[SHUWLVH DQG DXWKRULW\
FRQWURORYHUWKHDUPHGIRUFHVSROLFH
DQG LQWHOOLJHQFH RUJDQL]DWLRQV DQG




'XULQJ P\ ZRUN ZLWK &&05
, KDYH KDG WKH SULYLOHJH WR UHVHDUFK
GHPRFUDWLFFLYLOPLOLWDU\UHODWLRQVLQ
several newer democracies, including 
&KLOH DQG +XQJDU\ ZKLFK , DOVR





VDPSOH´ RI PLOLWDU\ HIIHFWLYHQHVV
WKH\ DUH ³OHVVRQVOHDUQHGEHVW
SUDFWLFHV´ZKLFKFRQWUDVWVWKHPIURP




regarding developing effective armed 
IRUFHV 7KH\ FDQ SURYLGH GDWD DQG
LQVLJKWV WKDWPD\EHRIXVH WRRWKHU
FRXQWULHV VKRXOG WKH SROLWLFDO ZLOO
H[LVWWRLPSOHPHQWFKDQJH)RUHDFK
FRXQWU\ , EDVHGP\ UHVHDUFK RQ WKH
IROORZLQJIRXUTXHVWLRQV
1. +DV WKH FRXQWU\ GHYHORSHG D
SODQ LQ SODFH ZKLFK PD\ WDNH WKH
IRUPRIDVWUDWHJ\RUHYHQDGRFWULQH"
2. +DV WKH FRXQWU\ GHYHORSHG
institutions (e.g. structures and 
SURFHVVHV WKDW KDYH RU DUH LQ WKH
SURFHVV RI IRUPXODWLQJ WKHVH SODQV




Yoma took a keen role in developing 
'HIHQVH 3ROLF\+H LQLWLDWHG VHYHUDO
FLYLOLDQ DQGPLOLWDU\ GHEDWHV DPRQJ
RI¿FHUV IURP WKH 0LQLVWULHV DQG
$UPHG )RUFHV FLYLOLDQV IURP WKH
&RQJUHVV WKLQN WKDQNV DFDGHPLF
LQVWLWXWLRQV DQG RWKHU QRQPLOLWDU\
RUJDQL]DWLRQV%\WKHODWHVWKH
PLOLWDU\ FDPH WR DFFHSW WKH FLYLOLDQ
³ULJKW´ WR GHYHORS GHIHQVH SROLF\ D
natural prerogative in a consolidated 
GHPRFUDF\3UHVLGHQW5LFDUGR/DJRV
 VRXJKW WR FRQWLQXH
WKH GLDORJXH RQ HIIHFWLYHQHVV DQG
PRGHUQL]DWLRQRI WKH$UPHG)RUFHV
+HORRNHGLQWRFRQIHUULQJWKHPLOLWDU\
a raison d’être in a time of peace, 
ZKLFKEURXJKWDERXWSRVLWLYHFKDQJHV
LQWKH$UPHG)RUFHV¶DWWLWXGHVWRZDUG
constitutional reforms, civilian 
GHFLVLRQV GHPRFUDF\ DQG KXPDQ
ULJKWV7KHQHZ&RQVWLWXWLRQDGRSWHG
LQ  SURYLGHG D FOHDUO\ H[WHUQDO
RULHQWDWLRQIRUWKHDUPHGIRUFHVZKLOH
VWLOO KDYLQJ OLPLWHG GRPHVWLF UROHV




WKH IRUFH VWUXFWXUH VWUHQJWKHQLQJ
MRLQW VWUXFWXUHV DQG RSHUDWLRQV DQG
reforming acquisitions, doctrines 
DQG PLOLWDU\ HGXFDWLRQ DQG WUDLQLQJ
DOVR WRRN SODFH )UHL DQG %DFKHOHW
administrations were marked 
E\ VRPH LPSRUWDQW OHJLVODWLYH
FKDQJHV ZKLFK WULJJHUHG D VHULHV
RI LQVWLWXWLRQDO RUJDQL]DWLRQDO DQG
structural transformations. After 
SURFUDVWLQDWLRQIRU¿YH\HDUVWKH/DZ
RQWKH2UJDQL]DWLRQDQG)XQFWLRQLQJ
RI WKH 0LQLVWU\ RI 'HIHQVH 02'
/DZZDVDSSURYHGLQ)HEUXDU\
RYHU WKH PLOLWDU\ ZKLOH GHFUHDVLQJ
WKH LQÀXHQFH RI WKH $UPHG )RUFHV
LQ WKH SROLWLFV DQG JRYHUQPHQW DQG
IRFXVLQJRQSURIHVVLRQDO LVVXHV KDV
WKHUHIRUH EHHQ UDWKHU SURWUDFWHG DQG
FXPEHUVRPHEXWQRWZLWKRXWUHDFKLQJ
WKH GHVLUHG HIIHFW )RUWXQDWHO\
&KLOH KDV LQFUHPHQWDOO\ GHYHORSHG
democratic Defense Institution 
%XLOGLQJDQGVWUHQJWKHQHGGHPRFUDWLF
&05LQFOXGLQJHIIHFWLYHQHVVZKLFK
KDV LQYROYHG SODQV VWUXFWXUHV
LQVWLWXWLRQV LQWHUDJHQF\ SURFHVVHV
as well as resources). After two 
GHFDGHV RI GHPRFUDWL]DWLRQ WKH
FLYLOLDQ JRYHUQPHQW KDV FRPH WR
XQGHUVWDQG WKHQHHG IRUDQHIIHFWLYH
PLOLWDU\DVDPHDQDQGWRROWRIXUWKHU
DQG FRQVROLGDWH IRUHLJQ SROLF\
DQG VHFXUH HFRQRPLF JDLQ ZKLOH
WKH PLOLWDU\ KDV XQGHUVWRRG WKDW




'XH WR WKH OHJDF\RI WKH SDVW LW
LVQRWVXUSULVLQJWKDWIRUPDQ\\HDUV
VLQFH WKH WUDQVLWLRQ FLYLOLDQV¶ PDLQ
REMHFWLYH ZDV DVVHUWLQJ GHPRFUDWLF
FLYLOLDQ FRQWURO 3UHRFFXSDWLRQ IRU
HIIHFWLYHQHVV KRZHYHU HPHUJHG
GXULQJWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQRI(GXDUGR
)UHL 5XL] 7DJOH  DQG
IXUWKHU GHYHORSHG E\ SUHVLGHQWV
5LFDUGR /DJRV  DQG
0LFKHOOH %DFKHOHW 
3UHVLGHQW )UHL KDG D ³FDUURWVDQG
VWLFNV´ DSSURDFK UHODWHG WR &05
DWWHPSWV WR EDODQFH VWUHQJWKHQLQJ
GHPRFUDWLF FLYLOLDQ FRQWURO WKXV
GHFUHDVLQJ PLOLWDU\ SUHURJDWLYHV
ZKLOH VXSSRUWLQJ PLOLWDU\
effectiveness and professionalism. 
'XULQJ WKH )UHL DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ
&KLOHDQ DXWKRULWLHV H[SHFW DOO WKH
GHVLUHG RXWFRPHV RI WKH02'/DZ
WR EH LPSOHPHQWHGIXO¿OOHG ZLWKLQ
WKHQH[WIRXUWR¿YH\HDUV
7KURXJKWKHSXEOLFSROLF\DJHQGD
GHYHORSHG LQ  '63 EHJDQ WR
VKDSH '63 GRFXPHQWV VWUDWHJLF
assessments, national strategic plans, 
strategic defense plans, as well as 
WKH:KLWH %RRN RI -RLQW 'RFWULQH
DV ZHOO DV WKH  &RQVWLWXWLRQ
HPSKDVL]H WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDOL]DWLRQ
RI WKH &KLOHDQ PLOLWDU\ WKURXJK
SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ SHDFH VWDELOLW\ DQG
reconstruction operations, as well 
DV VWUHQJWKHQLQJ QHLJKERUO\ DQG
UHJLRQDO FRRSHUDWLRQ 7KH :KLWH
%RRN  LV EDVHGRQ WKH1$72
DQG 6SDLQ¶V GRFWULQHV IROORZLQJ









:KDW DOVR FRQWULEXWHG WR
VWUHQJWKHQLQJ PLOLWDU\ HIIHFWLYHQHVV
LQ &KLOH ZDV SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ
LQWHUQDWLRQDO 3HDFH 2SHUDWLRQV
7KH PLOLWDU\ SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ VXFK
international and regional operations 
KDV EHHQ PXWXDOO\ EHQH¿FLDO WR
ERWK WKH FLYLOLDQ DQG PLOLWDU\
HOLWHV IRU WKH IRUPHU LQYROYHPHQW
LQ 362 LV SDUW DQG SDUFHO RI
FLYLOLDQ JRYHUQPHQWV¶ H[WHQGHG
foreign/diplomatic and economic 
SROLF\ DJHQGDV DV WKH &KLOHDQV
DFNQRZOHGJH WKDW JOREDOL]DWLRQ
GRHV QRW RQO\ EULQJ IUHH WUDGH DQG
GLSORPDWLF WLHV EXW DOVR VHFXULW\
DW WKH HQG RI WKH %DFKHOHW WHQXUH
ZKLFKOHIWWKHWDVNRILPSOHPHQWDWLRQ
WRWKHQHZ*RYHUQPHQWRI3UHVLGHQW
-RVp 3LxHUD  ± SUHVHQW 7KH
02' /DZ LV H[SHFWHG WR EULQJ
³ELJ´ FKDQJHV WR ERWK GHPRFUDWLF
control and effectiveness (and, 
WR VRPH H[WHQW HI¿FLHQF\ RI WKH
³UHYROXWLRQL]HG´$UPHG )RUFHV DQG
02' ZLWK DQ HPSKDVLV RQ EHWWHU
defense policies, increased civilian 
roles in designing and developing 
defense planning and strategic 
WKLQNLQJDQGLQFUHDVHGHIIHFWLYHQHVV
RI &KLOHPLOLWDU\ ZKLOH GHSOR\HG LQ
LQWHUQDWLRQDOPLVVLRQV7KH/DZ OHG
WR WKH FUHDWLRQ RI D VHULHV RI QHZ
VWUXFWXUHVZLWKLQWKH02'LQFOXGLQJ
D-RLQW&KLHIVRI6WDIIZKLFKKDVDQ
operational function), as well as an 
8QGHUVHFUHWDU\ IRU 'HIHQVH 3ROLF\
2I¿FH ZKLFK GHYHORSV GHIHQVH DQG
PLOLWDU\SROLF\DQGFRQGXFWVWKHPDLQ
GHIHQVHSODQQLQJ02'FLYLOVRFLHW\
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV DUH FRQ¿GHQW WKLV
/DZ DQG WKH2I¿FHZLOO HIIHFWLYHO\
VXSSRUW FLYLOLDQ SROLF\ PDNHUV WR
GHFLGHZKDW$UPHG)RUFHVDUHQHHGHG
LQ WKH IXWXUHDQG IRUZKDWSXUSRVHV
HVWDEOLVK D UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ WKH
GHFLVLRQ WR GHYHORS IRUFHV ZLWK WKH
GHFLVLRQ WR GHSOR\ WKHP HJ IRU
H[WHUQDOGHIHQVHSHDFHDQGVWDELOLW\
RSHUDWLRQV RU HYHQ LQWHUQDOO\ WR
take care during disasters, etc.),
KRZPXFK WR VSHQG RQ GHIHQVH DQG
KRZ FDQ HI¿FLHQF\ EH HQVXUHG DQG




DQG FRRSHUDWLRQZLWKLQ WKH GHIHQVH
VHFXULW\VHFWRUZLOODlso be improved. 
HIIHFWLYHQHVVGXHWRSHUFHLYHGWKUHDWV
DQG LQ UHODWLRQ ZLWK LQWHUQDWLRQDO
VHFXULW\FRRSHUDWLRQWKDWWKHFRXQWU\
VXSSRUWV ZKLFK KDYH LPSOLFDWLRQV
QRW RQO\ IRU VHFXULW\ WLHV EXW DOVR
for economic and foreign relations). 
&KLOHFRXOGDOVREHUHOHYDQWWRRWKHU
QHZ GHPRFUDFLHV HVSHFLDOO\ WKRVH
WKDW DUH QRW IURP 6RXWK (DVWHUQ
(XURSH 6(( GR QRW KDYH 1$72
DQGRU (8 WR SURYLGH WKHP ZLWK D
FKHFNOLVW RI DFFHVVLRQ UHTXLUHPHQWV
WR IRVWHU UHIRUP LQ WKDW &KLOH KDV
IROORZHG 1$72 GRFWULQH IRFXVLQJ
RQ 6SDLQ¶V Ln particular) to base 
WKHLU GHIHQVHSROLF\± DJDLQ DPRQJ
RWKHUUHDVRQV LQRUGHU WRHQVXUH WKH
PLOLWDU\LVHIIHFWLYHDQGLQWHURSHUDEOH
LQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRDOLWLRQV &KLOH
WKXVSURYLGHVDQH[DPSOHRIKRZD
QRQDVSLUDQW1$72FRXQWU\FDQXVH
1$72 PRGHO WR XQGHUWDNH PLOLWDU\
UHIRUP WKXV VKRZLQJ WKDW 1$72
FDQ KDYH DQ LQGLUHFW HIIHFW RQ WKH
PLOLWDU\ UHIRUP LQ FRXQWULHV WKDW GR
QRW QHFHVVDULO\ VHHN WR RU FDQQRW
become members). 
4.2. HUNGARY [8]
+XQJDU\ LV DQ H[DPSOH
of successful development of 
HIIHFWLYH DUPHG IRUFHV +XQJDU\
KDV HIIHFWLYH DUPHG IRUFHV
HVSHFLDOO\ ZKHQ FRQWULEXWLQJ WR
6WDELOLW\ 5HFRQVWUXFWLRQ DQG 3HDFH
2SHUDWLRQV 1$72 PHPEHUVKLS KDV
JUHDWO\ LPSDFWHG WKH UHIRUP LQ WKDW
LW IRUFHG WKH KDQG RI WKH+XQJDULDQ
JRYHUQPHQW WR FUHDWH RU UHRUJDQL]H
institutions involved in bringing 
about armed forces’ effectiveness. 
7KH URDG WR HIIHFWLYHQHVV KRZHYHU
KDV EHHQ ORQJ DQG KDPSHUHG E\
several obstacles. First, interest in 
FKDOOHQJHV DQG WKUHDWV ZKLFK LPSO\
VKDUHG VHFXULW\ UHVSRQsibilities); for 
WKHODWWHULWHQVXUHVWKHSUHVHUYDWLRQ
of institutional raison d’être ZLWK
DOO ¿QDQFLDO DQG PRUDO EHQH¿WV LQ
D VHFXULW\ HQYLURQPHQW WKDW PRYHV
DZD\ IURP WKH WUDGLWLRQDO LQWHUVWDWH
FRQÀLFW DQG LQ DQ RYHUDOO JOREDO
FRQWH[W RI HFRQRPLF KDUGVKLS
DV ZHOO DV D JUHDW RSSRUWXQLW\ IRU
ERRVWLQJ SURIHVVLRQDO H[SHULHQFH
DQG HIIHFWLYHQHVV WR ERWK SDUWLHV
VXFKSDUWLFLSDWLRQKHOSVPDLQWDLQLQJ
WKH DOUHDG\ HVWDEOLVKHG QRUPDOLW\
VWDELOLW\ GLDORJXH DQG WUDQVSDUHQF\




GXULQJ DQG HQVXLQJ WKH GHYDVWDWLQJ
)HEUXDU\  HDUWKTXDNH >@ 7KH
HDUWKTXDNH H[SHULHQFH GHPRQVWUDWHG
&KLOHDQ PLOLWDU\ HIIHFWLYHQHVV
HJ 362V WDXJKW WKH DUPHG IRUFHV
KRZ WR GHDO ZLWK FLYLOLDQV ZKHQ
reinstating order due to previous 
HQJDJHPHQW DQG LQWHUDFWLRQ ZLWK
1*2V UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV DQG RWKHUV LQ
362 VWDELOLW\ DQG UHFRQVWUXFWLRQ
RSHUDWLRQV YLD LQWHUQDWLRQDOO\
HVWDEOLVKHG 5XOHV RI (QJDJHPHQW
>52(V@DSHUKDSVGLIIHUHQWRXWFRPH
WZHQW\ \HDUV DJR ZKHQ WKH &KLOHDQ
PLOLWDU\ ZDV QRW LQYROYHG LQ 362
7KH $UPHG )RUFHV KDYH QRZ YHU\
KLJK SRSXODWLRQ WUXVW DQG VXSSRUW
IURP VRFLHW\ 3URIHVVLRQDO 0LOLWDU\
(GXFDWLRQ 30( DQG &LYLOLDQ
'HIHQVH(GXFDWLRQ&'(KDYHDOVR
KHOSHGLQFUHDVHHIIHFWLYHQHVV
&KLOH LV D JUHDW H[DPSOH RI
PXWXDO ZLOOLQJQHVV E\ WKH FLYLOLDQV
DQGWKHPLOLWDU\LQVWLWXWLRQVWRDFFHSW
and undergo democratic reforms, 
QRWRQO\LQWHUPVRIFRQWUROEXWDOVR
'XULQJ WKH ODWH V HVSHFLDOO\
DIWHU 1$72 LQWHJUDWLRQ DFFHOHUDWHG
DQG PRUH FRPSUHKHQVLYH GHIHQVH
UHIRUPV WRZDUG DQ H[SHGLWLRQDU\
1$72FRQWULEXWLQJ IRUFH KDYH WDNHQ
SODFH UHIRUPLQJ SHUVRQQHO DQG
WUDLQLQJ GHFUHDVLQJ WKH QXPEHU
RI RI¿FHUV LQWHURSHUDELOLW\ RI
XQLWV WR EH DVVLJQHG WR 1$72 DQG
disposing of redundant armament 
DQG HTXLSPHQW  IXUWKHU
PRGHUQL]DWLRQ DQG SURFXUHPHQW
HJQHZYHKLFOHV DUPDPHQWV VXFK
DV *ULSHQ -$6  ¿JKWHU SODQV
+DUULVDQG.RQJVEHUJWDFWLFDOUDGLRV
QHZ WUDQVSRUW YHKLFOHV DQG FXWWLQJ
GRZQPRUHPLOLWDU\IDFLOLWLHV
LPSURYLQJOLYLQJDQGZRUNLQJ
FRQGLWLRQV IRU +XQJDULDQ DUPHG




 /LNHZLVH LW ZDV
QRW XQWLO 1$72 LQWHJUDWLRQ WKDW
+XQJDU\¶VKDGVHHQDQLQFUHDVHLQWKH
GHIHQVH EXGJHW <HW VLQFH WKHQ WKH
'HIHQVH%XGJHWKDVEHHQGHFUHDVLQJ
FRQWLQXRXVO\  0RUHRYHU  ZDV
DQH\HRSHQHUIRUUHFRQVWUXFWLQJWKH
+XQJDULDQ$UPHG)RUFHVHVSHFLDOO\





LW KDV EHHQ D WKUHDW WR LWV PLOLWDU\
LQ $IJKDQLVWDQ LH ³ZLWKGUDZ RU
suffer more casualties”), but decision 
PDNHUV VHHP WR SD\ OLWWOH DWWHQWLRQ
WR WKLV 6HFRQG DQG UHODWHG WR WKH
SUHYLRXV '63 KDV GHYHORSHG DW
D YHU\ VORZ SDFH GXH WR ODFN RI
H[SHULHQFH DQG H[SHUWLVH HJ RQ
effectiveness, did not emerge until 
+XQJDU\MRLQHG1$72
DQG HYHQ WKHQ LWZDVPLQLPDO7KDW
LV EHFDXVHJRYHUQPHQWV ³VWDUWHGRXW
IURP WKH PLVWDNHQ DVVXPSWLRQ WKDW
1$72 DFFHVVLRn would not occur 
DQ\WLPHVRRQ´>@DVDUHVXOWSROLF\
PDNHUV ³VXSSRUWHG DV PXFK WKH
PLOLWDU\UHIRUPDVLWZDVQHFHVVDU\IRU
DFKLHYLQJ WKH LQYLWDWLRQ RI 1$72´
>@ 'HIHQVH UHIRUP EDVLFDOO\
LQYROYHGEXGJHWDU\FXWVIRUGHIHQVH
SHUVRQQHO GRZQVL]LQJ LQFOXGLQJ
civilian), as well as slow development 
RIDKRVWRIPLOLWDU\UHIRUPSODQVEXW
ZLWK YLUWXDOO\ ]HUR FKDQFH DQG WLPH
IRU LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ:LWK UHJDUG WR
UHVRXUFHV IRU GHIHQVH WKH FLYLOLDQ
HOLWHV LQ +XQJDU\ IRFXVHG RQO\ RQ
HQVXULQJWKHPLOLWDU\RI¿FHUVJRWSDLG
EXWLQFUHDVLQJO\FXWWLQJ>@PLOLWDU\
EXGJHWV IRU DQ\ UHIRUP SURJUDPV
7KH ODFN RI ¿QDQFLDO UHVRXUFHV
KHOG EDFN PLOLWDU\ UHVWUXFWXULQJ
DQG PRGHUQL]DWLRQ SURJUDPV
(including procurement, as well as 
UHVHDUFK DQG GHYHORSPHQW >@
stalled domestic and international 
education and training (including 
3I3FRQGXFWHG H[HUFLVHV YHU\
LPSRUWDQW IRU LQWHURSHUDELOLW\ ZLWK
LQWHUQDWLRQDO $OOLHV DQG 3DUWQHUV
PDGH UHFUXLWPHQW GLI¿FXOW DV ZHOO
as retaining volunteers), and reduced 
WKH PRUDOH ZLWKLQ WKH DUPHG IRUFHV
GXH WR UHODWLYHO\ ORZ SD\ DQG SRRU
KRXVLQJFRQGLWLRQV>@7KHSDFHRI
WKH UHIRUP KRZHYHU FKDQJHG DIWHU
>@+XQJDU\ UHFHLYHG DQ DFFHVVLRQ




GHYHORSHG 106 ZDV GHYHORSHG LQ
 E\ WKH 0LQLVWHU RI 'HIHQVH
02'DOVRLQYLWHGUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVRI
WKH*HQHUDO6WDII0LQLVWU\RI-XVWLFH
to assist developing it. In addition, 
FLYLOLDQ H[SHUWV HJ IRUPHU GHSXW\
VHFUHWDU\ RI GHIHQVH SROLF\ WKLQN
WDQNV UHVHDUFKHUV DQG RWKHUVZHUH
LQYLWHGWRGHEDWHLW9HU\LQWHUHVWLQJ
WKH0LQLVWU\RI'HIHQVHDOVR LQYLWHG
WKH UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV RI WKH 0LQLVWU\
RI)LQDQFH WR HQVXUH WKH ODWWHU OHDUQ
DQG XQGHUVWDQG ZKDW LV UHTXLUHG
IRU HQVXULQJ HIIHFWLYHQHVV RI WKH
DUPHG IRUFHV¶ 5ROHV DQG 0LVVLRQ
HVSHFLDOO\ EXGJHW UHODWHG LVVXHV
ZLWK WKH XOWLPDWH JRDO WR LQFUHDVH
IXQGLQJ IRU WKH PLOLWDU\ 7KH 106
ZDV DGRSWHG LQ  7RGD\ '63
LQ +XQJDU\ FRQVLVWV RI D KLHUDUFK\
of different documents, including 
WKH &RQVWLWXWLRQ ZKLFK LV UHZULWWHQ
as we speak, and will be approved 
QH[W \HDU WKH /DZ RQ +XQJDU\
'HIHQVH )RUFHV WKH 5HVROXWLRQ 1R
RI+XQJDULDQ1DWLRQDO
$VVHPEO\ RQ ³7KH %DVLF 3ULQFLSOHV
RI WKH 6HFXULW\ DQG 'HIHQVH 3ROLF\
RIWKH5HSXEOLFRI+XQJDU\´1$72
6WUDWHJLF &RQFHSW DQG DOO RWKHU
UHODWHG GRFXPHQWV DV ZHOO DV WKH
(8 &RPPRQ 6HFXULW\ DQG 'HIHQVH
3ROLF\
8QGHU WKHVH FLUFXPVWDQFHV
+XQJDU\ SURYLGHV D JRRG H[DPSOH
RI KRZ D PLOLWDU\ VWUXJJOHV GXH
WR LQVXI¿FLHQW UHVRXUFHV DQG HYHQ
precarious plans and policies, to 
RYHUFRPHHIIHFWLYHQHVV1HYHUWKHOHVV
LW DOVR SURYLGHV DQ H[DPSOH RI
KRZ HIIHFWLYHQHVV FDQ EH DFKLHYHG
WKURXJKVXEUHJLRQDOUHJLRQDOFRRSHUDWLRQ
1$72 PHPEHUVKLS DV ZHOO DV
participation in international missions 
OHG E\ 81 1$72 26&(, HWF
ZKDW WR GR ZLWK WKH PLOLWDU\ KRZ
WR SUHSDUH WKH PLOLWDU\ IRU IXWXUH
UROHV DQG PLVVLRQV ZKDW UHODWLRQV
WREXLOGZLWKGLIIHUHQWIDFWLRQVVXFK
DVSROLWLFDODQGFLYLOVRFLHW\DUHQDV
DV ZHOO DV RWKHU SULRULWLHV HJ
economic reform). It was not until 
ZKHQWKH3DUOLDPHQWLVVXHGWKH
³%DVLF3ULQFLSOHVRI6HFXULW\3ROLF\´
WKH ¿UVW GRFXPHQW WKDW GHDOW ZLWK
VHFXULW\DQGGHIHQVHLWZDVIROORZHG
E\WKH³%DVLF3ULQFLSOHVRI1DWLRQDO
'HIHQVH´ ODWHU WKDW \HDU 7KHVH WZR
documents set out roles and missions 
RI WKH DUPHG IRUFHV HJ WR GHIHQG
WKH FRXQWU\ DVZHOO DV WKHEDVLVRI
WKH+XQJDU\¶V'63 %DVHG RQ WKHVH
GRFXPHQWV WKH *RYHUQPHQW KDV
WR LVVXH DQG UHYLHZ WKH 1DWLRQDO





LQWR 1$72 DQG HYHQ DIWHU 1$72
PHPEHUVKLS +XQJDU\ KDG QR 166
RU 106 ,W KDV EHHQ D ORQJ ZDLWHG
SURFHVV,QWKHVSULQJRI02'
DQG 0)$ GHVLJQHG DQG GHYHORSHG
WKH ¿UVW 166 0)$ LV LQ FKDUJH RI
FRRUGLQDWLRQ RI WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI
WKH 166 ZKLFK ZDV DSSURYHG E\
WKH3DUOLDPHQW LQ7KHSURFHVV
ZDVLQWHJUDWLYHLQWKDWWKH02'DQG
0)$ LQYLWHG RXWVLGHUV LQFOXGLQJ
FLYLOVRFLHW\SDUOLDPHQWPHPEHUVWR
GLVFXVV DQG GHEDWH LW 7KH 1DWLRQDO
6HFXULW\ 6WUDWHJ\ VHWV WKH VWDJH
IRU WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI 0LQLVWHULDO
VWUDWHJLHV VXFK DV0LOLWDU\ )RUHLJQ
5HODWLRQV /DZ (QIRUFHPHQW
)LQDQFH ,QIRUPDWLRQ 6\VWHPV DQG
WKHOLNH+XQJDU\¶V1668SWRGDWH
KRZHYHURQO\WKH)RUHLJQ5HODWLRQV
DQG 0LOLWDU\ 6WUDWHJLHV KDYH EHHQ
6ORYDNLD +XQJDU\ LV FXUUHQWO\
contributing troops to international 
operations and missions, including 
,UDT .)25 (88126&( OHG
RSHUDWLRQV $IJKDQLVWDQ +XQJDU\¶V
FDSDELOLWLHV DQG SURIHVVLRQDOLVP KDV
been praised on numerous occasions 
E\ IRUHLJQ FRXQWHUSDUWV >@ $V
UHFRJQLWLRQ RI +XQJDU\¶V HIIHFWLYH
contribution to international missions 
HVSHFLDOO\ LQ WKH ¿HOG RI PLOLWDU\
PHGLFLQH 1$72 HVWDEOLVKHG LQ
+XQJDU\ D &HQWHU 2I ([FHOOHQFH LQ
0LOLWDU\ 0HGLFLQH LQ  DV WKH
SULPDU\VRXUFHRIPLOLWDU\PHGLFLQH
H[SHUWLVH IRU 1$72 30( ZKRVH
REMHFWLYHLVDFKLHYLQJWKHWKUHHOHYHOV




$OO WKHVH OHG WR D EHWWHU
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RQ WKH FLYLOLDQ VLGH
RI WKHQHHG IRU DQHIIHFWLYHPLOLWDU\
HVSHFLDOO\ GXH WR +XQJDU\¶V
1$72(8 PHPEHUVKLS GXWLHV DQG
REOLJDWLRQVLQDVHFXULW\HQYLURQPHQW
WKDW ODFNV WKH WKUHDW RI D WUDGLWLRQDO
DGYHUVDU\ +XQJDU\ KDV EHFRPH DQ
important and effective contributor 
WRPLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQVLQWKH%DONDQV






0RQJROLD EHDULQJ LQ PLQG LWV
KLVWRU\DQGORFDWLRQKDVVXFFHVVIXOO\
IRFXVHG LWV &05 DQG ',% SURFHVV
UHIRUP RQ DFKLHYLQJ HIIHFWLYHQHVV
RI WKH DUPHG IRUFHV LQ SDUWLFXODU LQ
SHDFHVXSSRUWRSHUDWLRQV7KHUHKDYH
(YHQLIWKHWUDGLWLRQDOH[WHUQDOWKUHDW
KDV YLUWXDOO\ GLVDSSHDUHG ZKLFK
KRZHYHU +XQJDU\¶V PLOLWDU\ GRHV
QRW WRWDOO\ H[FOXGH ZKLFK KDV
PLQLPL]HGWKHDUPHGIRUFHV¶IRFXVRQ
¿JKWLQJ H[WHUQDO ZDUV SDUWLFLSDWLRQ
in regional/international peace 
RSHUDWLRQV KXPDQLWDULDQ UHOLHI DQG
countering terrorism efforts, are a 
IHZ RI +XQJDU\¶V PLOLWDU\ FXUUHQW
UROHV DQG PLVVLRQV +XQJDU\¶V
contribution to regional cooperation 
KDV HQFRPSDVVHG SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ
WKH 9LVHJUDG JURXS WKH &HQWUDO
(XURSHDQ ,QLWLDWLYH &(, WKH
6RXWKHDVW (XURSHDQ &RRSHUDWLYH
,QLWLDWLYH 6(&, WKH 6WDELOLW\ 3DFW
IRU 6RXWK (DVWHUQ (XURSH 1$72
(8 PHPEHUVKLS UHTXLUHPHQWV
DQG DFFHVVLRQ SURJUDPV VXFK
DV 3I3 ,33 3$53 KDYH KHOSHG
VWUHQJWKHQ +XQJDU\¶V DUPHG IRUFHV
LQWHURSHUDELOLW\ DQG FRPSDWLELOLW\
ZLWK LWV ZHVWHUQ FRXQWHUSDUWV
(IIHFWLYHFRQWULEXWLRQWR811$72
(8 IRUFHV DQGRU 26&( RSHUDWLRQV
KDV LQFOXGHG WKH IROORZLQJ






FDSDELOLWLHV VXFK DV 2SHUDWLRQDO
0LOLWDU\ /LDLVRQ 7HDPV 20/7
DQG 3URYLQFLDO UHFRQVWUXFWLRQ
7HDP 357 LQ WKHDWHU 5HJLRQDO
FRRSHUDWLRQ KDV HQFRPSDVVHG
SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ WKH +XQJDULDQ
5RPDQLDQ 3HDFHNHHSLQJ %DWWDOLRQ
WKH 0XOWLODWHUDO /DQG )RUFH 0/)
ZLWK ,WDO\ -XOLD $OSLQH %ULJDGH
6ORYHQLD DQG &URDWLD VLQFH 
DQG WKH 7LVD PXOWLQDWLRQDO HQJLQHHU
EDWWDOLRQ ZLWK 5RPDQLD 8NUDLQH
a professional and interoperable 
PLOLWDU\<HW XQWLO  DPDMRULW\
of politicians and even senior 
PLOLWDU\ RI¿FHUV ZHUH UHOXFWDQW WR
VXSSRUW 0RQJROLD¶V SDUWLFLSDWLRQ
WR 362 DV WKH\ WKRXJKW 0RQJROLD
PLOLWDU\ZDV QRW VXI¿FLHQWO\ WUDLQHG
WRIXO¿OO362PLVVLRQV,QDGGLWLRQ
DFFRUGLQJ WR %UXQHDX DQG 0HQGHH
WKH 0RQJROLDQ DUPHG IRUFHV ZHUH
XQNQRZQWRWKH81'3.2DQGHYHQ
LWV RZQ 3HUPDQHQW0LVVLRQ LQ 1HZ
<RUN+RZHYHU WKH86 UHTXHVWV IRU
WURRSFRQWULEXWLRQLQ$IJKDQLVWDQDQG
,UDT EURXJKW FKDQJHV LQ WKH VXSSRUW
IRU 0RQJROLDQ 362 GHSOR\PHQWV
in general, and armed forces 
HIIHFWLYHQHVV LQSDUWLFXODU 7KH86
UHTXHVWLQLWLDWHGDEURDGGHEDWHDWWKH
16& DQG WKH SDUOLDPHQW SURPSWHG
FORVHU LQWHUDJHQF\ FRRUGLQDWLRQ DQG
FRRSHUDWLRQDPRQJVHFXULW\LQYROYHG
ministries and institutions, elicited 
DGGLWLRQDOUHVRXUFHDOORFDWLRQVIRUWKH
362 DGPLQLVWUDWLYH ORJLVWLFV DQG
WUDLQLQJ DQG VWUHQJWKHQHG PLOLWDU\
FRRSHUDWLRQ ZLWK :HVWHUQ FRXQWULHV
DQG QHLJKERUV  7KH$UPHG )RUFHV
'HYHORSPHQW3ODQWRIROORZHG
LQDNH\¿QDQFLDOFRPPLWPHQW
from political leaders to improve 
0RQJROLD¶VPLOLWDU\ HIIHFWLYHQHVV LQ
362  7KH SODQ OHG WR WKH FUHDWLRQ
RI D 362 EULJDGH D 5HJLRQDO
3HDFHNHHSLQJ 7UDLQLQJ &HQWHU D
PHGLFDO¿HOGKRVSLWDODQGRWKHU362
FDSDELOLWLHV ,W VKRXOG EH QRWHG WKDW
LQ VWUHQJWKHQLQJ 362 FDSDELOLWLHV
RI LWV DUPHG IRUFHV 0RQJROLD KDV
FDSLWDOL]HG RQ 86 *RYHUQPHQW
support and assistance programs 
LQFOXGLQJ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 0LOLWDU\
(GXFDWLRQDQG7UDLQLQJ ,0(7DQG
*OREDO 3HDFH 2SHUDWLRQV ,QLWLDWLYH
*32, $ /DZ RQ 3DUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ
WKH362ZDVHQDFWHGLQZKLFK
allows annual budget and resource 
EHHQ DW OHDVW IRXU >@ LQFHQWLYHV
IRU0RQJROLDWREHFRPHLQYROYHGLQ
peace support operations. First, is 
0RQJROLD¶V ³WKLUG QHLJKERU SROLF\´
ZKHUHE\ WKe couQWU\ HVWDEOLVKHV
DOOLDQFHV ZLWK OLNHPLQGHG QDWLRQV
WKURXJK PXOWLODWHUDO DFWLRQ LQ
RUGHU WR OHVVHQ WKH LQÀXHQFH RI
LPPHGLDWH QHLJKERUV 6HFRQG GXH
WR OLPLWHG EXGJHWV IRU WKH PLOLWDU\
WKHFRPSHQVDWLRQIRUHTXLSPHQWDQG
WUDLQLQJ E\ LQYROYHPHQW LQ 362 LV
VROLGLQFHQWLYH7KLUGLVWKHLQFUHDVHG
HPSKDVLV RQ DQG SUHRFFXSDWLRQ
IRU XWLOLW\ RI H[WHUQDO VWDQGDUGV IRU
UHDGLQHVVDVZHOODVWKHFRPPLWPHQW
to training and equipment. And, 
IRXUWK LV0RQJROLD¶VSRVW&ROG:DU
SROLF\ RI ³UHEUDQGLQJ´ WKH DUPHG
forces for international versus national 
SXUSRVHV$OO WKHVH LQFHQWLYHV ZHUH
PRWLYDWLQJQRWRQO\GHFLVLRQPDNHUV
ZLWKLQ WKH 0LQLVWU\ RI 'HIHQVH
EXW DOVR WKH FLYLOLDQV ³DQ DOOSDUW\
FRQVHQVXV WKDW VXUYLYHG VXFFHVVLYH
FKDQJHVRIJRYHUQPHQW´>@ 6LQFH
DSSUR[LPDWHO\  0RQJROLD KDV





VLQFH WKH HQG RI WKH &ROG:DU7KH
&RQVWLWXWLRQSURYLGHGIRUUROHV
DQG PLVVLRQV RI WKH DUPHG IRUFHV
A new defense concept followed, 
FRXSOHG ZLWK YDULRXV ODZV DQG
UHJXODWLRQVHJ/DZRQWKH1DWLRQDO
6HFXULW\ &RXQFLO LQ  WKH /DZ
RQ 'HIHQVH RI  D 1DWLRQDO
6HFXULW\ &RQFHSW LQ  DQG WKH
/DZRQ WKH$UPHG)RUFHV RI 
IRUWKHPLOLWDU\VHHNLQJWRWUDQVIRUP
WKH 6RYLHWVW\OH DUPHG IRUFHV LQWR
IRUFHVDVXPPDU\RIWKH¿QGLQJVLV
GLVSOD\HGLQTable no. 1).
$W D PLQLPXP PLOLWDU\
effectiveness requires political will 
DQG RQJRLQJ LQWHUHVW 3ROLWLFDO ZLOO
DQG LQWHUHVW FDQ KDYH DQ LQWHUQDO
GULYHLQFHQWLYH2Q WKH RQH KDQG LW
could be direct interest in developing 
democratic institutions (including 
effective armed forces), for rational 
JURXQGV ± VXFK DV SXQLVKLQJ QRQ
democratic regime abuses and 
SUHYHQWLQJ WKH FRQWLQXDWLRQRI WKHVH




PRUH ÀH[LEOH DQG ZLWK PRUH UDSLG
UHDFWLRQ FDSDELOLWLHV ZLWK EHWWHU
guidance, direction, and coordination 
E\WKHFLYLOLDQGHFLVLRQPDNHUVZLWK
QHZ SHUVRQQHO WKDW KDG QRW EHHQ
LQYROYHG LQ KXPDQ ULJKWV YLRODWLRQV
DQG DEXVHV ZKLFK EHQH¿WV IURP
EHWWHUPRUH DWWUDFWLYH FDUHHU SDWKV
SURIHVVLRQDO PLOLWDU\ DQG FLYLOLDQ
HGXFDWLRQ ERWK LQ FRXQWU\ DQG
abroad), and better budgeting 
SROLFLHV2QWKHRWKHUKDQG LWFRXOG
EH DZDUHQHVV RI WKH SRVW&ROG:DU
JOREDO VHFXULW\ FKDOOHQJHV DQG
WKUHDWVHJLQWUDVWDWHFRQÀLFWIDLOHG
VWDWHV WHUURULVP RUJDQL]HG FULPH
HWFZKLFK KDYH SURPSWHG VHFXULW\
LQVWLWXWLRQV DGMXVW DQG UHGH¿QH WKHLU
UROHV DQG PLVVLRQV ZLWK D KHDY\
IRFXVRQH[WHUQDO3HDFH6XSSRUWDQG
6WDELOLW\ 2SHUDWLRQV RU LQ WKH FDVH
RI,QGLDIRFXVHGRQLQWHUQDOVHFXULW\
in order to become more effective 
DQGSURIHVVLRQDO$OO WKUHHFRXQWULHV
VWXGLHG &KLOH +XQJDU\ 0RQJROLD
DUH H[FHOOHQW H[DPSOHV ZKHUHE\
DZDUHQHVVRIWKUHDWVE\SROLF\PDNHUV






D QRQDVSLULQJ 1$72PHPEHU XVHV
1$72 DORQJVLGH RWKHU :HVWHUQ
GHIHQVH UHIRUP VWDQGDUGV WR VKDSH
',%7KLVLVH[SODLQHGE\0RQJROLD¶V
GHVLUHWRPRYHDZD\IURPLWV6RYLHW
past and become interoperable and 
compatible in international operations. 
7KH DGRSWLRQ RI 1$72 VWDQGDUG
+4 V\VWHP LQ  HPSOR\PHQW
RI :HVWHUQ 30( VWDQGDUGV DW
WKH 'HIHQVH 8QLYHUVLW\ LQ 
development of non-commissioned 
RI¿FHUFRUSVVHOIVXVWDLQLQJ(QJOLVK
WUDLQLQJ FDSDELOLW\ KDYH SURYHG WKH
GHSDUWXUHIURPWKH6RYLHWHUD
0RUH FKDQJHV DUH FRPLQJ
UHJDUGLQJ VWUHQJWKHQLQJ 0RQJROLD¶V
PLOLWDU\362HIIHFWLYHQHVVLQFOXGLQJ
UHYLVLRQ RI 1DWLRQDO 6HFXULW\ DQG
'HIHQVH&RQFHSWVDQGDVWDWHGJRDORI
a potential increase in defense budget 





also led to more trust and support for 
WKH PLOLWDU\ E\ 0RQJROLDQ VRFLHW\
362 LV EHLQJ UHFRJQL]HG DV WKH
IRUHLJQSROLF\LQVWUXPHQWIRUELODWHUDO
and multilateral cooperation among 
DOO0RQJROLDQDUHQDVVWDWHSROLWLFDO
economic, civil).
5. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE 
STUDIES
%DVHGRQP\UHYLHZRIWKH'HIHQVH
,QVWLWXWLRQ %XLOGLQJ DQG &LYLO
0LOLWDU\ 5HODWLRQV GHYHORSPHQWV LQ
WKHVHWKUHHFRXQWULHV,FDQVXPPDUL]H
WKH IROORZLQJ NH\ SRLQWV YLVjYLV
DFKLHYLQJHIIHFWLYHQHVVRIWKHDUPHG
GHIHQVHDQGVHFXULW\ZDVDGUDZEDFN
IRU DOO WKUHH FRXQWULHV EXW WKURXJK
30(&'( WKLV REVWDFOH LV EHLQJ
PLQLPL]HG ,Q DGGLWLRQ WLPH ZDV
FUXFLDOIRUWKHFRXQWULHVWKDWUHFRUGHG
PLOLWDU\ HIIHFWLYHQHVV QRWKLQJ KDV
KDSSHQHG RYHUQLJKW LW WRRN WZHQW\
\HDUVRUVRIRUDOO WKUHHFRXQWULHV WR
develop effective armed forces. 
$OWKRXJK QRQH RI WKH VXUYH\HG
FRXQWULHVIDOOVLQWKLVFDWHJRU\&05
',% LV QRW D OLQHDU SURFHVV DQG
SDVW H[SHULHQFH LV QR JXDUDQWHH RI
FRQWLQXHGVXFFHVV7KHUHIRUHFLYLOLDQV
in democracies (old and new) need to 
UHPDLQIRFXVHGRQEDODQFLQJPLOLWDU\
DFFRXQWDELOLW\ ZLWK HIIHFWLYHQHVV LQ


















































for developing effective armed 
IRUFHV LQQHZHUGHPRFUDFLHV ,KDYH
OHG WR LPSURYHG HIIHFWLYHQHVV RI WKH
DUPHGIRUFHV3ROLWLFDl will can also be 
PRWLYDWHGE\H[WHUQDOLQFHQWLYHV7KLV
FRXOG EH ³FDUURWV DQG VWLFNV´ IURP
1$72 (8 7KH WZR RUJDQL]DWLRQV
PHPEHUVKLS PRUH WKDQPHPEHUVKLS
UHTXLUHPHQWV ZKLFK LQFOXGHG
LQVWLWXWLRQDOL]LQJ DUPHG IRUFHV WKDW
are effective and interoperable, 
ZKLOH XQGHU GHPRFUDWLF FRQWURO
KDYH LQÀXHQFHG +XQJDU\ GHYHORS
DQG LPSOHPHQW :HVWHUQ PLOLWDU\
effectiveness and professionalism 
VWDQGDUGV ([WHUQDO LQFHQWLYHV FDQ
DOVREHDVHFXULW\GHIHQVHLQWHOOLJHQFH
crisis or failure (e.g. a terrorist attack, 
RU D GRPHVWLF VHFXULW\ LVVXH WKDW
triggers developing or consolidating 
PLOLWDU\ HIIHFWLYHQHVV HJ +XQJDU\
DIWHU
,DOVRREVHUYHGWKDWFRXQWULHVWKDW
KDG DQ H[WHUQDO GULYH DQG LQFHQWLYH
IRU&05DQGHIIHFWLYHQHVVKDYHEHHQ
PRUH DGYDQFHG WKDQ WKH RWKHUV LQ
WHUPVRIUHIRUPHJ+XQJDU\YHUVXV
0RQJROLD2Q WKH RWKHU KDQG ERWK
&KLOHDQG0RQJROLDKDYHSURYHGWKDW













KDQG KDYH VXIIHUHG IURP OLPLWHG
UHVRXUFHV 7KH\ WKHUHIRUH KDG WR
FDSLWDOL]H RQ SODQV DQG VWUXFWXUHV
(including coordination and 
FRRSHUDWLRQ WR VXFFHVVIXOO\ DFKLHYH
HIIHFWLYHQHVV /DFN RI H[SHUWLVH LQ
ENDNOTES




DIWHU ,UDT´ 6XUYLYDO 9RO 
1XPEHU  $XWXPQ  
82. ,Q DGGLWLRQ %ULWLVK VFKRODU
RI6657LPRWK\(GPXQGVDOVR
ORRNVWRWKHVHLVVXHV6HH7LPRWK\
(GPXQGV ³:KDW are Armed 
)RUFHV )RU" 7KH &KDQJLQJ
1DWXUH RI 0LOLWDU\ 5ROHV LQ
Europe,” International Affairs 
9RO1R.
$OVR DOO RI 665 SURSRQHQWV
address effectiveness.
>@ For a discussion on roles and 
PLVVLRQV DQG WKH PL[HV LQ
GLIIHUHQW FRXQWULHV VHH 3DXO
6KHPHOOD ³7KH 6SHFWUXP RI
5ROHVDQG0LVVLRQVRIWKH$UPHG
)RUFHV´ LQ 7KRPDV %UXQHDX
DQG 6FRWW 7ROOHIVRQ HGV :KR
*XDUGVWKH*XDUGLDQVDQG+RZ




Fiasco: The American Military 
Adventure in Iraq (1HZ <RUN
3HQJXLQ3UHVVIRUDZHOO
UHVHDUFKHGDFFRXQWRIWKHSRRU
planning and implementation 
RI 86 VHFXULW\ LQ ,UDT ZLWK
VHULRXV FRQVHTXHQFHV IRU WKH
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ RI *HRUJH :
%XVK DQG LQGHHG RI 8QLWHG
6WDWHV¶JOREDOSUHVWLJH
>@ D GLVFXVVLRQ RQZK\ LW LV GLI¿FXOW
to measure effectiveness, see 
7KRPDV & %UXQHDX DQG )ORULQD
&ULVWLDQD &ULV 0DWHL ³7RZDUGV




IRXQG WKDW DOWKRXJK DFKLHYLQJ DQG
VWUHQJWKHQLQJ PLOLWDU\ HIIHFWLYHQHVV
LVQRW DOZD\VDQXUJHQWJRDO IRU WKH
FLYLOLDQHOLWHV LW LVQRWXOWLPDWHO\DQ
LPSRVVLEOH MRE IRU FLYLOLDQV LQ QHZ
GHPRFUDFLHV , WKHUHIRUH DUJXH WKDW
WKHWKUHHFRXQWULHVKDYHVXFFHVVIXOO\
developed effective armed forces, 
ZKLFK DUH WRGD\ UHOLDEOH DOOLHV DQG




WKDW FLYLOLDQ SROLF\ PDNHUV DUH NH\
SOD\HUVLQFLYLOPLOLWDU\UHODWLRQVDQG
defense reform, including creating 
HIIHFWLYH DUPHG IRUFHV , KRSH WKH
DUWLFOHWREHUHOHYDQWWRSROLF\PDNHUV
and intelligence professionals in 
RWKHUHPHUJLQJGHPRFUDFLHV
7. ACKNOWLEDGMENT
7KH YLHZV H[SUHVVHG LQ WKLV
SDSHU DUH WKH DXWKRU¶V DORQH DQG GR
QRW QHFHVVDULO\ UHÀHFW WKRVH RI WKH










&&05 UHVHDUFK SURMHFW RQ'HIHQVH
,QVWLWXWLRQ %XLOGLQJ ',% ZKLFK
UHVXOWHGLQSDSHUV)LQDOO\WKHDXWKRU
ZRXOGOLNHWRWKDQNWKH86(PEDVVLHV
02' UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV PHPEHUV RI
WKH/HJLVODWXUHVDQGFLYLOVRFLHW\LQ
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)DVFHOO 1RUWK6RXWK &HQWHU DW
WKH8QLYHUVLW\ RI0LDPL&RUDO
*DEOHV )ORULGD 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DQG WKH 0LOLWDU\ LQ &KLOH´
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